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ARGUMENT 
!• THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DID NOT DEEM MS. SEALS' ADVERSARY 
PROCEEDING TO BE "WHOLLY UNNECESSARY." IN POINT OF 
FACT, THE BANKRUPTCY COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
MS. SEALS' FAVOR. 
In his statement of the "Nature of the Case/' Mr. 
Condie asserts that "[t]he bankruptcy court at the time of 
those proceedings in its' [sic] own words, deemed the 
adversarial proceeding to be to be [sic], ^wholly 
unnecessary/"1 Mr. Condie also makes essentially the same 
assertion in several other places throughout his Brief. It 
is clearly false. 
The part of the record to which Mr. Condie cites in 
support of his assertion (i.e., R. 424) is Judge Skanchy's 
January 31, 2005 Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment 
and for a Finding of Contempt. It is not the bankruptcy 
court's own words, as Mr. Condie alleges, but Judge 
Skanchy's misinterpretation of a statement made by the 
bankruptcy judge taken out of context. In paragraph 3(b) of 
his Order, Judge Skanchy mistakenly 
"notes that the Hopkinsville obligation was satisfied 
in April 2001, thus making any subsequent proceedings 
in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary as is underscored by 
the Bankruptcy Court's own musings after listening to 
Appe l l ee ' s Brief at p . 3 . 
1 
the parties' argument in Seals' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment that '...under the circumstances I 
can't see that there is any dispute.'" 
(R. 424). 
Judge Skanchy simply misinterpreted the bankruptcy 
judge's statement. The bankruptcy judge's statement that 
"under the circumstances I can't see that there is any 
dispute"2 was not intended to signify that Ms. Seals' 
adversary proceeding was "unnecessary." To the contrary, it 
was clearly intended to signify that Ms. Seals was entitled 
to summary judgment because, based upon the undisputed 
facts, Ms. Seals was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 
See Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 
After listening to Mr. Condie acknowledge in open court that 
he did not dispute the material facts upon which Ms. Seals' 
nondischargeability claim was based, but that he had some 
unintelligible concern that "they're trying to look for some 
way to come back in State Court somehow," the bankruptcy 
judge ruled in Ms. Seals' favor as follows: 
The Court: All right. Well, I'm not sure that we've 
reached a meeting of the minds here but under the 
circumstances I can't see that there is any dispute. 
There is certainly no contested issue of fact and, 
therefore, as a matter of law I'm going to find that 
2R. 457. 
2 
Paragraph 14 [i.e., the hold harmless provision of the 
Decree of Divorce] represents an obligation that [Mr. 
Condie] owed as of the date of filing [of his 
bankruptcy petition] to [Ms. Seals], and that it arose 
in the context of the divorce proceeding and is 
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(15). 
(R.458-457)(emphasis added). 
In short, it is clear that Judge Skanchy misinterpreted 
the bankruptcy court's "musings." Ms. Seals fully prevailed 
on her claim in bankruptcy court because there was no 
dispute with respect to the material facts and she was 
entitled to. the relief which she requested as a matter of 
law. It is inconceivable that the bankruptcy court would 
have granted Ms. Seals summary judgment if it had deemed her 
adversary proceeding to be unnecessary.3 
3In part IV of his Argument, Mr. Condie also argues that Ms. 
Seals' adversary proceeding was unnecessary because she did not 
own the real property subject to the Hopkinsville mortgage at the 
time and Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank was not aggressively 
pursuing its collection action against Ms. Seals. This argument 
is specious. Regardless of the ownership of the property subject 
to the mortgage, there is no question that until it was paid off 
in April 2004 Ms. Seals remained fully liable for payment of the 
promissory note. 
Likewise specious is Mr. Condie's suggestion that Ms. Seals 
had nothing to worry about because he arranged for his friend, 
Brian Steffensen, to become the holder of the note. Given the 
animosity between the parties, that suggestion is almost comical. 
Had Ms. Seals not prosecuted her non-dischargeability action in 
bankruptcy court, Mr. Steffensen or any subsequent holder could 
have pursued Ms. Seals for payment of the note and Ms. Seals 
would have had no recourse against Mr. Condie under the hold 
harmless provision of the Decree of Divorce because his 
obligation would have been discharged. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). 
3 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DOES NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES IN CONNECTION WITH § 523(a) (15) 
LITIGATION. 
In point I of his Argument, Mr. Condie first contends 
that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provided the bankruptcy court with 
statutory authority to award Ms. Seals' attorney fees in 
connection with her adversary proceeding. According to Mr. 
Condie, § 105(a) is "commonly used to make an award of 
attorney fees in bankruptcy cases/'4 It is significant that 
Mr. Condie fails to cite to any authority which would 
support this proposition.5 Ms. Seals' own research reveals 
that there is no such authority. While § 105(a) authorizes 
the bankruptcy court to award sanctions and attorney fees 
for violations of the § 5246 discharge injunction, e.g., 
Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439 (1st Cir. 
2000), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 1048, 121 S.Ct. 2016, 149 
L.Ed. 2d 1018 (2001), and to award attorney fees as a 
4Appellee's Brief at p. 10. 
5Ms. Seals believes that it would be appropriate for the 
Court to find that Mr. Condie's Brief fails to comply with Rule 
24(a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(failure to cite to 
pertinent authority renders an issue inadequately briefed "when 
the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the 
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court77) . 
611 U.S.C. § 524. 
4 
sanction for bad faith conduct, In re Nichols, 221 B.R. 275, 
279 (Bkrtcy. N.D.Okla 1998), there is not a single case in 
which it has been used as authority for an award of attorney 
fees in connection with § 523(a)(15)7 litigation. 
Mr. Condie next attempts to distinguish Ms. Seals' 
adversary proceeding from Dennison v. Hammond (In re 
Hammond), 236 B.R. 751, 769 (Bankr. D.Ut. 1998), as follows: 
The distinction between Dennison and the present case 
is that the ex-wife in Dennison was an actual creditor 
while Ms. Seals, in the present case, did not even have 
a cognizable claim.8 
Mr. Condie's contention that Ms. Seals "did not even 
have a cognizable claim" is frivolous and is asserted in bad 
faith without any factual or legal basis. It is 
inconceivable that the bankruptcy court would have granted 
Ms. Seals summary judgment on a claim which was not 
cognizable. At the risk of redundancy, the bankruptcy court 
specifically recognized and granted summary judgment on Ms. 
Seals' § 523(a) (15) claim. (R. 263). 
Mr. Condie also misrepresents that "[t]he Bankruptcy 
Court acknowledged that the Hopkinsville obligation had been 
satisfied in April of 2001..." There is absolutely nothing 
711 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15) . 
8Appellee's Brief at p.10. 
5 
in the record or elsewhere which would even remotely support 
this representation and Mr. Condie fails to provide any 
support for this representation in his Brief. 
Likewise without merit is Ms. Condie's contention that 
Rule 7054 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
provided a basis upon which the bankruptcy court might have 
awarded attorney fees to Ms. Seals. Under Rule 7054 the 
bankruptcy court "may allow costs to the prevailing 
party...," however, attorney fees are generally not 
available. E.g., In re Nichols, supra, 221 B.R. at 280, n. 
6 (citing Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 
386 U.S. 714, 717-718, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1406-1407, 18 L.Ed.2d 
475 (1967)). In Nichols, the court noted the "exception to 
the general rule if provided for under a statute or under 
Rule 9011." Id. (citing 10 King et al., Collier on 
Bankruptcy SI 7054.05 (15th ed. 1998)). In other words, 
there is nothing in Rule 7054 which would authorize an award 
of attorney fees except in those exceptional circumstances 
in which they are otherwise authorized under the "American 
Rule." 
It is noteworthy that the author of the Dennison 
opinion was the Honorable Judith A. Boulden, the very judge 
6 
who presided over Ms. Seals' adversary proceeding against 
Mr. Condie. In Dennison, a case which is directly on point, 
Judge Boulden specifically denied the non-debtor spouse's 
request for attorney fees because she could find "no case 
law, contractual or statutory basis for an award of attorney 
fees incurred in this [§ 523(a) (15)] proceeding..." 
Dennison, supra, 236 B.R. at 769. Judge Boulden was 
certainly aware of § 105(a) and Rule 7054 when she ruled 
that there is no statutory basis for an award of attorney 
fees in § 523(a) (15) litigation. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DENY MS. SEALS' REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES BASED UPON "MR. CONDIE'S INABILITY TO 
PAY. " 
In point II of his Argument, Mr. Condie asserts that 
the trial court's denial of Ms. Seals' request for attorney 
fees was based in part on its finding of "Mr. Condie's 
inability to pay."9 That is clearly not the case and, once 
again, Mr. Condie fails to provide any meaningful support 
for his assertion. Instead, he cites to the trial court's 
ruling on the issue of Mr. Condie's contempt for failing to 
pay child support: 
The Court finds that there is no basis for a finding of 
9Appellee's Brief at p. 15. 
7 
contempt, as the evidence concerning Condie's financial 
condition during the periods in question and the 
payments on child support he did make suggest that 
Condie was not intentionally or deliberately avoiding 
or neglecting his obligation to his children. 
(R. 425) . 
The evidence concerning Mr. Condie's "financial 
condition during the periods in question" to which the trial 
court refers is Mr. Condie's testimony that his income fell 
from $80,400 in 2001 to $6,402 in 2003. (R. 550 at page 
112, lines 20-21). However, the period in question for 
purposes of an award of attorney fees was the date of the 
December 2004 hearing. Mr. Condie testified that in 
December 2004 he was receiving a monthly salary of $6,500, 
i.e., $78,000 annually. (R. 550 at page 115, line 6). 
In short, while the trial court's ruling on the issue 
of contempt was based in part on Mr. Condie's "financial 
condition during the periods in question," its ruling on Ms. 
Seals' request for an award of the attorney fees which she 
was forced to incur in connection with Mr. Condie's 
bankruptcy proceedings was based entirely on its conclusions 
of law: (1) that the bankruptcy proceedings were the time 
and place for an award of attorney fees; and (2) that the 
"Hopkinsville obligation was satisfied in April 2001, thus 
8 
making any subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy wholly 
unnecessary../' (R. 425-424). 
IV. MS. SEALS HAS SATISFIED ANY OBLIGATION WHICH SHE MAY 
HAVE HAD TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
In point III of his Argument, Mr. Condie contends that 
Ms. Seals has failed to marshal the evidence.10 
Unfortunately, Mr. Condie fails to provide any analysis with 
respect to this contention. Nor does he point to any 
evidence in the record which he claims Ms. Seals has failed 
to marshal. In fact, Mr. Condie does not even identify the 
finding of fact with respect to which he contends Ms. Seals 
failed to satisfy the marshaling requirement. 
In her Opening Brief, as a precaution, Ms. Seals 
marshaled the evidence11 with respect to what she believes 
is actually a conclusion of law, but which she was concerned 
might be characterized as a finding of fact, i.e., the trial 
court's determination that "the Hopkinsville obligation was 
satisfied in April 2001, thus making any subsequent 
proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary..." (R. 424). 
In doing so, Ms. Seals respectfully submits that she first 
marshaled all of the evidence which supports the trial 
10Appellee's Brief at pp. 15-16. 
nAppellant's Opening Brief at pp. 17-18. 
9 
court's determination and then demonstrated that despite 
this evidence the determination is so lacking in support as 
to be "against the clear weight of evidence.,7 See Crockett 
v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Accordingly, Ms. Seals submits that she has satisfied 
any obligation which she may have had to marshal the 
evidence. 
V. MS. SEALS' APPEAL IS WELL GROUNDED IN FACT AND IS 
WARRANTED BY EXISTING LAW. 
Finally, Mr. Condie contends that he is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure "based on Ms. Seals' frivolous 
appeal."12 According to Mr. Condie, "Ms. Seals' failure to 
marshal the evidence, along with the lack of legal basis for 
her appeal amounts to a frivolous claim."13 Ms. Seals 
respectfully submits that Mr. Condie's contention is 
unfounded. 
As set forth above, Ms. Seals has in fact satisfied any 
obligation which she may have had to marshal the evidence. 
Further, even if Ms. Seals' marshaling of the evidence is in 
some manner deficient, Mr. Condie fails to cite to any 
12Appellee's Brief at p. 20. 
13Appellee's Brief at p. 20. 
10 
authority which would support the proposition that failing 
to satisfy the marshaling requirement renders an appeal 
frivolous. Nor does Mr. Condie provide any analysis or 
citation to authority with respect to his contention that 
Ms. Seals' appeal is without a legal basis. 
Thus, Ms. Seals respectfully submits that Mr. Condie 
has done nothing to suggest either that: (1) the facts set 
forth in support of Ms. Seals' appeal are less than well 
grounded in the record; or (2) that the legal authority to 
which Ms. Seals has cited in her Briefs fails to provide 
sufficient warrant for her appeal under existing law. 
Accordingly, Mr. Condie's contention may itself be in 
violation of Rules 24(a)(9) and 33, URAP, and should be 
rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Seals respectfully requests 
that the trial court's Order and Judgment be reversed to the 
extent that it denies Ms. Seals' request for a judgment for 
the attorney fees incurred in connection with Mr. Condie's 
bankruptcy proceedings and that this matter be remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings. Ms. Seals also 
requests an award of attorney fees incurred in prosecuting 
11 
this appeal in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) 
DATED this /'^-day of December 2005. 
5cojtt B{ Mitchell 
lorney for Appellant 
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